ABOUT                              RESEARCH                              MISC

 

Overview:

My main research area is normative ethics; especially population and procreation ethics. My BPhil thesis discussed Parfit's last published attempts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Non-Identity Problem under uncertainty. At Oxford, I was advised by Jeff McMahan. At Princeton, I work with Johann Frick.

My second area of research is epistemology. I have written about knowledge-how, skill, epistemic luck, and suspension of judgment. Currently, I am interested in a cluster of interconnected topics: inquiry, double-checking, and epistemic consequentialism. In the future, I intend to investigate the numerous interconnections between epistemology and ethics. At Oxford, I was advised by Tim Williamson. At Princeton, I work with Tom Kelly.

I also have a strong interest in distinctively practical ethics. At Oxford, I worked on the ethics of emerging technologies under the supervision of Anders Sandberg from the Future of Humanity Institute. In particular, I have written about existential risk, predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system, cognitive enhancement, and automation of work.

Publications:

(1) Friedman on Suspended Judgment.Synthese. (forthcoming).

Abstract: In a series of articles, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order question-directed attitude and that one suspends judgment on some matter if and only if one genuinely inquires into this matter. This paper responds to Friedman's arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of this attitude and raises worries about the details of her positive claim that one suspends iff one inquires. It subsequently defends a novel reductive higher-order propositional account of suspended judgment.

(2) On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly. (accepted). Winner of the 2018 "Philosophy of Derek Parfit" Essay Prize

Work in progress:

(3) A paper on epistemic junk

(4) A paper on double-checking

(5) A paper on the Non-Identity Problem, deontology, and uncertainty

(6) A paper on Parfit's Imprecise Lexical View

(7) A paper on epistemic luck, knowledge-how, and skill

(8) A paper on knowledge-how and the regress argument

If you are interested in reading any of these papers, send me an email.