ABOUT                          RESEARCH                       TEACHING                       MISC

 

Overview:

My main research area is normative ethics. I particular, I have written about population and procreation ethics. My BPhil thesis discussed Parfit's last published attempts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Non-Identity Problem under uncertainty. At Oxford, I was advised by Jeff McMahan. At Princeton, I work with Johann Frick.

My second area of research is epistemology. I have thus far written about knowledge-how, skill, epistemic luck, and suspension of judgment. At the moment, I am thinking about pragmatic encroachment, moral encroachment, and double-checking. In the future, I intend to investigate the many interconnections between epistemology and ethics. At Oxford, I was advised by Tim Williamson. At Princeton, I work with Tom Kelly.

I also have a strong interest in distinctively practical ethics. At Oxford, I worked on the ethics of emerging technologies under the supervision of Anders Sandberg from the Future of Humanity Institute. In particular, I have written about existential risk, predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system, cognitive enhancement, and automation of work.

Publications:

(1) Friedman on Suspended Judgment.Synthese. (forthcoming).

Abstract: In a series of articles, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order question-directed attitude and that one suspends judgment on some matter if and only if one genuinely inquires into this matter. This paper responds to Friedman's arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of this attitude and raises worries about the details of her positive claim that one suspends iff one inquires. It subsequently defends a novel reductive higher-order propositional account of suspended judgment.

Submitted:

(2) A paper on Parfit's last published article (name redacted)

(3) A paper on knowledge-how and epistemic luck (name redacted)

In progress:

(4) On Parfit's Imprecise Lexical View

Abstract: In his penultimate paper, Parfit appeals to the relations of lexical betterness and imprecise equality to resist the Continuum, the Sequential Benign Addition, and the Simple Benign Addition arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper presents a range of objections to this Imprecise Lexical View, evaluates different conceptions of evaluative imprecision, and concludes that Parfit's view is not a satisfactory response to the aforementioned arguments.

(5) A deontological solution to the Real-World Non-Identity Problem

Abstract: The Real-World Non-Identity Problem is the problem of accounting for the moral reason we intuitively have to create an individual who is conditionally expected to have the better life, rather than another individual who is conditionally expected to have a worse, but nonetheless good, life. This paper argues that we have a moral reason to minimise the risk of creating an individual with a bad life, and that, in almost all real-world procreation cases, the better an individual's life is conditionally expected to be, the less likely she is to have a bad life.

(6) Intellectualism about knowledge-how and the regress argument

(7) What's the point of double-checking?

If you are interested in reading any of these papers, send me an email.