My research focuses on the significance of time and possibility in moral philosophy. Our lives are situated between the past and the future, unfold over time, could have gone better, and might be radically transformed by technology. My work seeks to illuminate how these kinds of features affect what is valuable and what we have reasons to do. Much of this work concerns four related topics: preservation of value, well-being, ethics of technology, and the future of humanity. But I also maintain side-interests and have published articles in epistemology and the history of philosophy.



Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism

Abstract: Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic consequentialism which avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least in part on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive makeup places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long.


Wasted Potential: The Value of a Life and the Significance of What Could Have Been
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 51 (1): 6-32.

Abstract: According to the orthodox view, the goodness of a life depends exclusively on the things that actually happened within it, such as its pleasures and pains, the satisfaction of its subject’s preferences, or the presence of various objective goods and bads. In this paper, I argue that the goodness of a life also depends on what could have happened, but didn’t. I then propose that this view helps us resolve ethical puzzles concerning the standards for a life worth living for animals and the significance of a life’s shape.


Healthspan Extension, Completeness of Life, and Justice
Bioethics, 37: 239-245.

Abstract: Recent progress in geroscience holds the promise of significantly slowing down or even reversing ageing and age-related diseases, and thus increasing our healthspans. In this paper, I offer a novel argument in favour of developing such technology and making it unconditionally available to everyone. In particular, I argue that justice requires that each person be provided with sufficient opportunities to have a ‘complete life’, that many people currently lack such opportunities, and that we would substantially improve the status quo by giving them access to anti-ageing technology.


What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?
Utilitas, 33 (4): 379-383. With John Broome and 27 co-authors.

Abstract: The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.


Schopenhauer on Suicide and Negation of the Will
The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29 (3): 494-516.

Abstract: Schopenhauer's argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for many modern-day commentators. Dale Jacquette, Sandra Shapshay, and David Hamlyn all argue that the premises of this argument or its conclusion are inconsistent with Schopenhauer's wider metaphysical and ethical project. This paper defends Schopenhauer from these charges. Along the way, it examines the relations between suicide, death by voluntary starvation, negation of the will, compassion, and Schopenhauer's critiques of cynicism and stoicism.


On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle
The Philosophical Quarterly, 70 (278): 114-139.

Abstract: In 'Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles' (2017), Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper shows that even the best version of Parfit's principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable.


Friedman on Suspended Judgment
Synthese, 197 (11): 5009-5026.

Abstract: In a series of articles, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order question-directed attitude and that one suspends judgment on some matter if and only if one genuinely inquires into this matter. This paper responds to Friedman's arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of this attitude and raises worries about the details of her positive claim that one suspends iff one inquires. It subsequently defends a novel reductive higher-order propositional account of suspended judgment.



A paper on the significance of progress

Abstract: I explain when and why it is better if the history of humanity features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration.


A paper on preserving relationships and projects

Abstract: I argue that we have a distinctive moral reason to conserve certain prudential goods even when a superior replacement is available.


A paper on the problem of replacement

Abstract: I develop a unified explanation of when and why it is better to extend the existence of a person, non-human animal, or humanity as a whole rather than allow for their replacement, even if the total welfare would be the same.

If you are interested in reading or discussing any of these papers, send me an email.