Overview:

My main research area is normative ethics; especially population and procreation ethics. My BPhil thesis discussed Parfit's last published attempts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Non-Identity Problem under uncertainty. At Oxford, I was advised by Jeff McMahan. At Princeton, I work with Johann Frick.

My second area of research is epistemology. I have written about knowledge-how, skill, epistemic luck, and suspension of judgment. Currently, I am thinking about epistemic consequentialism. In the future, I intend to investigate the numerous interconnections between epistemology and ethics. At Oxford, I was advised by Tim Williamson. At Princeton, I work with Tom Kelly.

I also have a strong interest in distinctively practical ethics. At Oxford, I worked on the ethics of emerging technologies under the supervision of Anders Sandberg from the Future of Humanity Institute. I have written about existential risk, predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system, cognitive enhancement, and automation of work.

Publications:

(1) Friedman on Suspended Judgment.Synthese. (forthcoming).

Abstract: In a series of articles, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order question-directed attitude and that one suspends judgment on some matter if and only if one genuinely inquires into this matter. This paper responds to Friedman's arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of this attitude and raises worries about the details of her positive claim that one suspends iff one inquires. It subsequently defends a novel reductive higher-order propositional account of suspended judgment.

(2) On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly. (forthcoming).Winner of the 2018 Essay Prize.

Abstract: In the posthumously published 'Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles' (2017), Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper shows that even the best version of Parfit's principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable. This paper further addresses important questions which Parfit left unanswered concerning: the relative importance of individual and collective goodness, comparisons involving unequal outcomes, how to understand individual goodness, and whether incomparability at the level of individual goodness implies incomparability at the level of overall goodness.

Work in progress:

(3) A paper on the Risky Existential Question and the Repugnant Conclusion (with Kacper Kowalczyk)

(4) A paper on epistemic value

(5) A paper on epistemic consequentialism and demandingness

(6) A paper on epistemic consequentialism and inquiry

(7) A paper on the Non-Identity Problem, deontology, and uncertainty

(8) A paper on Parfit's Imprecise Lexical View

(9) A paper on epistemic luck, knowledge-how, and skill

(10) A paper on knowledge-how and the regress argument

If you are interested in reading any of these papers, send me an email.