I am currently working on a series of papers concerning well-being and time, in which I address the following questions: Do we have reason to conserve existing ingredients of well-being, such as loving relationships and personal projects, when a superior replacement is available? If so, what is the ground, scope, content, and strength of these reasons? What is the significance of a life's shape? Can it be better for a person not to extend their life, even if the additional years would be in themselves worth living? Are there distinctive goods or bads of childhood and old age? Should we welcome or dread the increasingly realistic prospect of radical life extension?

Beyond that, I work on a variety of issues in normative ethics, epistemology, and the ethics of technology: the significance of modal features for theorizing about value, population ethics, inquiry, suspension of judgment, epistemic consequentialism, privacy and surveillance, and existential risk.


4. What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?. Utilitas. (forthcoming). (with St├ęphane Zuber and 27 co-authors) [abstract]

3. Schopenhauer on Suicide and Negation of the Will. The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. (2021). [abstract]

2. On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly. (2020). [abstract]

1. Friedman on Suspended Judgment. Synthese. (2020). [abstract]