Overview:

My dissertation is about the view that certain valuable things are worth conserving even when a superior replacement is available. G. A. Cohen dubbed it 'Conservatism about Value'.

On the theoretical side, I examine what explains the presence of conservative reasons, how strong these reasons are, which things we have reasons to conserve, and who these reasons apply to.

On the practical side, I argue that this view illuminates old and new puzzles concerning: the shape of a life, the significance of progress, how one should direct their life at its different stages, end-of-life decisions, grief, and life extension technology, among other things.

Beyond that, I work on a variety of issues in normative ethics (population ethics and well-being), epistemology (inquiry, suspension of judgment, and epistemic consequentialism), and ethics of technology (life extension, privacy, and existential risk).

Publications:

4. What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?. Utilitas. (forthcoming). (with Stéphane Zuber and 27 co-authors) [abstract]

Abstract: The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

3. Schopenhauer on Suicide and Negation of the Will. The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. (2021). [abstract]

Abstract: Schopenhauer's argument against suicide has served as a punching bag for many modern-day commentators. Dale Jacquette, Sandra Shapshay, and David Hamlyn all argue that the premises of this argument or its conclusion are inconsistent with Schopenhauer's wider metaphysical and ethical project. This paper defends Schopenhauer from these charges. Along the way, it examines the relations between suicide, death by voluntary starvation, negation of the will, compassion, and Schopenhauer's critiques of cynicism and stoicism. The paper concludes that there may be gaps in Schopenhauer's system, but not where the aforementioned commentators tried to locate them.

2. On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly. (2020). [abstract]

Abstract: In the posthumously published 'Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles' (2017), Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper shows that even the best version of Parfit's principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable. This paper further addresses important questions which Parfit left unanswered concerning: the relative importance of individual and collective goodness, comparisons involving unequal outcomes, how to understand individual goodness, and whether incomparability at the level of individual goodness implies incomparability at the level of overall goodness.

1. Friedman on Suspended Judgment. Synthese. (2020). [abstract]

Abstract: In a series of articles, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order question-directed attitude and that one suspends judgment on some matter if and only if one genuinely inquires into this matter. This paper responds to Friedman's arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of this attitude and raises worries about the details of her positive claim that one suspends iff one inquires. It subsequently defends a novel reductive higher-order propositional account of suspended judgment.

In progress / Under review:

A paper on the significance of progress – I explain why it is better for the history of humanity to feature a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, other things equal.

A paper on conserving prudential goods – I develop a view which says that we have a moral reason to preserve certain prudential goods, such as loving relationships and important projects, even when a superior replacement is available.

A paper on the grounds of conservatism about value – I defend the view that we have a reason to preserve certain valuable things when and because this is an appropriate response to their value from a recent critique.

A paper on life extension technology – I argue that we have a justice-based reason to develop and widely distribute anti-ageing technology.

A paper on end-of-life decisions – I explain why we can have a moral reason to extend our lives even if the extra years would be bad for us and why we can have a moral reason not to extend our lives even if the extra years would be good for us.

A paper on wasted potential – I argue that how good a life is for an individual depends partly on facts about their potential.

A paper on epistemic demandingness – I defend epistemic consequentialism from a recent charge that it is overly demanding.

If you are interested in reading any of these papers, email me. I would be greatful for any comments, large or small.