My dissertation is about the view that certain valuable things are worth conserving even when a superior replacement is available. G. A. Cohen dubbed it 'Conservatism about Value'.

On the theoretical side, I examine what explains the presence of conservative reasons, how strong these reasons are, which things we have reasons to conserve, and who these reasons apply to.

On the practical side, I argue that this view illuminates old and new puzzles concerning: the shape of a life, the significance of progress, how one should direct their life at its different stages, end-of-life decisions, grief, and life extension technology, among other things.

Beyond that, I work on a variety of issues in normative ethics (population ethics and well-being), epistemology (inquiry, suspension of judgment, and epistemic consequentialism), and ethics of technology (life extension, privacy, and existential risk).


4. What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?. Utilitas. (forthcoming). (with Stéphane Zuber and 27 co-authors) [abstract]

3. Schopenhauer on Suicide and Negation of the Will. The British Journal for the History of Philosophy. (2021). [abstract]

2. On Parfit's Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly. (2020). [abstract]

1. Friedman on Suspended Judgment. Synthese. (2020). [abstract]

In progress / Under review:

A paper on the significance of progress – I explain why it is better for the history of humanity to feature a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, other things equal.

A paper on conserving prudential goods – I develop a view which says that we have a moral reason to preserve certain prudential goods, such as loving relationships and important projects, even when a superior replacement is available.

A paper on the grounds of conservatism about value – I defend the view that we have a reason to preserve certain valuable things when and because this is an appropriate response to their value from a recent critique.

A paper on life extension technology – I argue that we have a justice-based reason to develop and widely distribute anti-ageing technology.

A paper on end-of-life decisions – I explain why we can have a moral reason to extend our lives even if the extra years would be bad for us and why we can have a moral reason not to extend our lives even if the extra years would be good for us.

A paper on wasted potential – I argue that how good a life is for an individual depends partly on facts about their potential.

A paper on epistemic demandingness – I defend epistemic consequentialism from a recent charge that it is overly demanding.

If you are interested in reading any of these papers, email me. I would be greatful for any comments, large or small.